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NOTE
APPLICATION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION TO AMERICAN
LITIGANTS: INCORPORATING THE SUBSEQUENT
INTERPRETATIONS OF SIGNATORY STATES INTO THE ANALYSIS
OF THE U.S. JUDICIARY
International agreements, such as the Hague Convention on the Tak-
ing of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters ("Hague Con-
vention" or "Convention"),1 manifest the desire of sovereign states to
reach specific understandings on common concerns.2 Signatory states
entrusted with their interpretation must therefore consider a variety of
interests when interpreting international accords. Because the goal of
interpretation is to accurately ascertain an agreement's meaning, signato-
ries should take into account foreign interests in addition to domestic
interests. When interpreting treaties, the United States judiciary utilizes
traditional principles of interpretation shared, in large part, by other civil
and common law countries. More importantly, American courts place
substantial reliance upon subsequent interpretations by sister signatories
of international accords.3
Recently, the United States Supreme Court deviated from this "Princi-
ple of Subsequent Conduct"4 when it relegated the provisions of the
Hague Convention to optional status for litigants in American courts
seeking evidence abroad.5 The Court gave only passing notice to the po-
sitions of signatory governments. 6 Instead, the Court advanced those in-
terests unique to the United States, clearly the signatory with the most
1. The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1781 (West Supp. 1988).
2. J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER AND N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES
AND MATERIALS 952 (2d ed. 1981).
3. See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
4. The phrase "Principle of Subsequent Conduct" was coined in M. McDOUGAL, H. LASs-
WELL & C. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 56, 58
(1967). See infra note 36 for further discussion.
5. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court for the Southern
District of Iowa, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) [hereinafter Societe Nationale]. See infra notes 48-79 and
accompanying text for discussion of this case.
6. Although four states submitted amicus briefs-France, Federal Republic of Germany,
Switzerland, and Great Britain and Northern Ireland-the Supreme Court declined to respond to
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liberal discovery provisions.7 This Note posits that the Supreme Court
deviated from the established Principle of Subsequent Conduct and, as a
result, curtailed significantly the use of the mutually beneficial provisions
provided by the Convention.
This Note will first examine the history of the Hague Convention, the
purposes advanced by its drafters, and the Convention's basic provisions.
Second, it will survey traditional principles of treaty interpretation, fo-
cusing on the usage of the above principle. Next, the discussion will ana-
lyze American courts' interpretations of the Hague Convention. 8
Finally, this Note will consider the subsequent interpretations offered by
signatories to the Convention, including legislative responses, judicial in-
terpretations, and positions of signatory governments officially transmit-
ted to the United States. The author concludes that if United States
courts would focus on subsequent interpretations of signatory states, the
courts would realize a more accurate interpretation of international ag-
greements such as the Convention.
any concerns set forth in the briefs, except to recognize France's position in a footnote. Id. at 2548
n.11.
7. Id. at 2553-54 n.25. The United Kingdom, a common law country like the U.S., has recog-
nized the extensive use of discovery by American courts. In Radio Corporation of America v. Rau-
land Corporation, [1956] 1 Q.B. 618, the House of Lords reaffirmed England's dismay with the
techniques employed by U.S. courts. The court stated, "it is plain that the principle has been carried
much further in the United States of America than it has been carried in this country." Id. at 643-
44.
See FED. RULE Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privi-
leged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action. ..).
In civil law countries, discovery is typically assigned to judges rather than to the parties. This
procedure results in more streamlined, less intrusive methods for discovery. Langbein, The German
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 824 (1985). See also infra note 14, for further
discussion on differences between civil and common law countries' discovery methods. For a sum-
mary of civil law procedure, see J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 120-31 (1969).
8. Both the courts and the executive branch have roles in interpreting treaties, but the judici-
ary is traditionally considered subordinate to the executive branch in resolving disputes between
foreign states. For example, in 1952 the acting legal advisor for the Department of State informed
the Judicial Department that grants of sovereign immunity would be curtailed under a newly an-
nounced policy of the United States. This announcement, embodied in the Tate Letter, named after
the acting legal advisor, was an attempt by the executive branch to dictate the theory of sovereign
immunity to be followed by the United States. Although this policy eventually eroded and the State
Department once again became active in deciding such matters on a case by case basis, the judiciary
never questioned the authority of the executive to dictate such policy. See J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER
& N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 302 (2d ed. 1981)
(discussion of the Tate Letter and cases in which the executive intervened to determine outcomes).
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I. THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE
ABROAD IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS
A. Historical Foundations
In 1968 the Hague Conference on Private International Law adopted
the Hague Convention,9 the fundamental purpose of which was to "im-
prove mutual judicial co-operation in civil or commercial matters."" °
The United States became a party to the agreement in 1972," and to date
twenty states, including the U.S., have deposited instruments of accession
or ratification with the Conference.1 2
The drafters operated under the assumption that any system of inter-
national discovery must be "tolerable" in the state of execution.1 3 To
accomplish this goal, they sought, among other things, to bridge the fun-
damental differences between discovery techniques used in civil and com-
mon law countries.'" Accordingly, the procedures adopted incorporate
9. Supra note 1.
10. Id.
11. 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY (pt VII) 15 0987). Other signatory states
include Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of
Germany, Greece, Great Britain, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Turkey, the United Arab Republic, Observers of Indo-
nesia, and Yugoslavia. See infra note 12 for a list of states that have ratified or acceded to the
Convention.
12. Ratifying and acceding countries include Argentina, Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Monaco, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the United States. 8 MARTIN-
DALE-HUBBELL LAW DICTIONARY (pt. VII) 15 (1987); 27 I.L.M. 277-79 (1988). Article 39 of the
Hague Convention specifically provides that:
Any State not represented at the Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law which is a Member of this Conference or of the United Nations or of a
specialized agency of that Organization, or a Party to the Statute of the International
Court of Justice may accede to the present Convention....
Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 39.
The Convention's provisions replaced Articles 8-16 of the Hague Conventions on Civil Procedure
of 1905 and 1954 as between signatory states who were parties to the earlier agreements.
13. Amram, Explanatory Report on the Convention, reprinted in PERMANENT BUREAU OF THE
HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, PRACTICAL HANDBOOK ON THE OPER-
ATION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF (18 MARCH 1970) ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD
IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATrERS 20 (1984) [hereinafter PRACTICAL HANDBOOK] (statement of
Dr. Arnold, Chairman of the Hague Evidence Convention).
14. Most civil law countries do not permit the taking of evidence by persons other than judicial
officers. In Germany, for example, judges are granted power to order evidence only if it is probative
of some issue of fact. This requires lawyers to provide sufficient evidentiary foundations to the judge
prior to requesting a discovery order. Shemanski, Obtaining Evidence in the Federal Republic of
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and improve upon the existing technique of letters rogatory. " The draft-
ers sought to enlarge the means of obtaining evidence abroad and to pre-
serve more lenient techniques developed prior to the Convention through
cooperation among individual states. 16
William Rogers, Secretary of State during the Nixon administration,
transmitted his recommendation on the Hague Convention to the Presi-
Germany: The Impact of The Hague Evidence Convention on German-American Judicial Coopera-
tion, 17 INT'L LAW. 465, 466 (1983).
Additionally, under German law witnesses are examined by the judge and are typically required to
testify only once. Following the examination, the judge summarizes the testimony for the record;
rarely is a verbatim transcript of the evidence used. Langbein, supra note 7, at 828.
In France, another civil law country, evidence gathering by litigants is also severly restricted, both
by custom and under the French Code of Civil Procedure. Borel & Boyd, Opportunities for and
Obstacles to Obtaining Evidence in France for Use in Litigation in the United States, 13 INT'L LAW.
35, 36 (1976). Judges have the sole power to order factual investigations, appoint experts, summon
parties to give testimony, and summarize the testimony of witnesses. Id.
Both German and French rules of discovery are highly restrictive in comparison to discovery in
the U.S. under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The drafters of the Hague Convention recog-
nized these differences and sought to find ways in which common law courts could gain access to
essential information without offending the sovereignty of the state receiving the request. At the
same time, no country was expected to give up its local practice and procedure but to permit, when
necessary, access to information. This would be accomplished by asking those states requesting
information to adhere, as closely as possible, to traditional methods of discovery in the forum state.
Report of United States Delegation to the Eleventh Session of the Hague Convention on Private Inter-
national Law, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 804, 806 0969).
See also Letter of Submittal to President of U.S. from William P. Rogers of Nov. 9,1971, reprinted
in 12 I.L.M. 324 (1973)(increased trading and litigation prompts "need for effective international
agreement to set up a model system to bridge differences between common law and civil law ap-
proaches"). For additional information on differences between civil law and common law discovery
techniques, see Martens, German Civil Procedure and the Implementation of the Hague Evidence
Convention, 1985 INT'L Lrr. Q. 115.
15. Report of the United States Delegation to the Eleventh Session of the Hague Convention on
Private International Law, reprinted in, 8 I.L.M. 804, 807 (1969).
16. PRACTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 20, and Convention, supra note 7, art. 27.
Philip W. Amram, the Rapporteur of the Convention, enunciated the three goals of the Conven-
tion as follows:
a) Improve the existing system of Letters of Request; and
b) enlarge the devices for the taking of evidence by increasing the powers of consuls and by
introducing, on a limited basis, the concept of the commissioner; and at the same time
c) preserve all existing and more favorable and less restrictive practices resulting from
internal law, internal rules of procedure and bilateral or multilateral conventions.
PRACTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 20. Amram also stated the fundamental purpose of the
Convention was the "revision and modernization of [the] Hague Convention on Civil Procedure of
1905 and 1954." Id.
Several subjects were not addressed at the Convention because the drafters felt they were suffi-
ciently addressed in previous Conventions or were properly left to each state's domestic laws. These
include free legal aid, immunity of a witness from arrest or service of process, effects of the refusal of
a witness to appear, the problem of dual nationality and the powers of arbitration courts. Id. at 34.
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dent in 1971.17 The letter endorsed the Convention's procedures.18 Pres-
ident Nixon agreed with Rogers and urged approval of the accord by the
Senate. 19 The Senate later approved the Convention and its procedures
came into force for American litigants on October 7, 1972.20
B. Basic Convention Provisions
The Hague Convention provides two procedures by which a signatory
(or contracting) state may obtain evidence abroad. Chapter I allows a
contracting state to send a Letter of Request to a signatory state seeking
evidence for its own judicial proceedings. The recipient state may refuse
to comply with this section if the state feels its sovereignty or security
would be threatened."' Chapter II gives a contracting state the power to
take evidence from another state's national through diplomatic officers,
consular agents, and commissioners. These procedures are not mutually
exclusive and may be used in combination. For instance, a recipient may
require the presence of a judicial officer from the recipient state during
the execution of a letter22 or require permission from the requesting
state's officials prior to discovery under Chapter 11.23
Chapter III of the Convention contains two provisions that greatly
limit application of its procedures to foreign states. First, under Article
23 a contracting state may declare that it will not execute Letters of Re-
quest designed to obtain pre-trial discovery of documents.24 As of 1988,
thirteen of the twenty contracting states had made such declarations.25
Conversely, Article 27 states that the agreement shall not prevent a
signatory state from utilizing alternative methods, or procedures less re-
strictive than those provided in the Convention. American courts have
17. Letter of Submittal of Nov. 9, 1971, reprinted in 12 LLM. 324 (1973).
18. Id. Rogers was particularly swayed by the prompt ratification of the treaty by "five impor-
tant states": the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom and
Northern Ireland. Id. at 324, 326. Rogers believed that because these five states acceded to the
agreement, the agreement was significant. Id. at 327.
19. Message From the President Transmitting to the Senate the Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, reprinted in 12 LLM. 323 (1973).
20. Hague Convention, supra note 1.
21. Hague Convention, supra note 1, at art. 12(b).
22. Id., art. 8.
23. Id., art. 15.
24. Civil law countries, unlike common law countries, do not typically engage in pre-trial dis-
covery but instead seek only those documents relevant for use at trial. See supra note 14 for a
discussion of the differences between civil and common law discovery methods.
25. 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBEL LAW DIRECTORY (pt. VII) 15-19 (1987).
1989]
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cited this provision in support of the proposition that procedures pro-
vided in the agreement are optional;26 however, some commentators
claim that Article 27 merely indicates that the convention's procedures
reflect the minimum procedures required of each signatory.27
II. TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF TREATY INTERPRETATION
The United States judiciary considers several different categories of in-
formation when charged with the interpretation of international agree-
ments. This is especially true when the meaning agreed upon by
signatories is not clearly evident from the text of the agreement. 28 Pre-
paratory works, diplomatic correspondence, the overall purposes of the
convention,29 and drafting negotiations may be consulted.30 Courts also
attribute meaning to domestic sources that influenced the formation of
the agreement.31 In addition, great weight is usually given to the views
of the Department of State and Justice Department, 32 enforcers of trea-
26. For the latest case making this claim, see Societe Nationale, 107 S. Ct. 2542 0987). See also
Lasky v. Continental Prod. Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1127, 1129 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
27. See, eg., Comment, The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters: The Exclusive and Mandatory Procedures for Discovery, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
1461, 1468-470 (1984).
28. Generally, courts consult the text of the treaty as the first step towards its interpretation.
Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 53-54 (1983) (consulting the text of the treaty and the con-
text in which the words are used). See also Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985) (interpreting the
word "accident" as used in the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Agreement by first making
reference to the context in which the word was used); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
opened for signature May 23,1969, art. 31 (1), reprinted in, 8 I.L.M. 679-735 (1969) (requiring inter-
pretation "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose").
29. Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079,1088 (2d Cir. 1977). See also Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311
U.S. 150, 163 (1940); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293-94 (1933); United States v. A.L.
Burbank & Co., 525 F.2d 9, 12-14 (2d Cir. 1975); Board of County Commissioners v. Aerolineas
Peruanasa, S.A., 307 F.2d 802, 806-07 (5th Cir. 1962).
30. Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. 341, 359-60 (1933); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276,
294-95 (1933); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102,112 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIoN
RELATIONS LAW §§ 147 (1)(b), (c) (1965). But see CHANG, THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATiES 59
0950) (discounting oral statements made by parties not embodied in writing and not communicated
to the negotiator of the agreement).
31. When the agreement is being interpreted to determine its effect as domestic law, sources
may include committee reports, debates, and meanings attributed to the agreement by the legislative
branch. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 151, 152 (1965).
32. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS LAW §§ 151, 152 (1965).
In Kolovrat an Oregon resident died leaving property to Yugoslavian relatives. Interpreting an
Oregon statute providing that Yugoslavs could not inherit property and an 1881 treaty between the
U.S. and Serbia, the Supreme Court stated "[w]hile courts interpret treaties for themselves, the
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ties to which the U.S. is a party. Comity-the recognition one state gives
to another state's interests-is also considered during the interpretative
process.33
The Principle of Subsequent Conduct has long been regarded as a
prime canon of treaty construction.34 The U.S. Supreme Court and
lower federal courts have attributed great weight to this principle,35 as
have several scholars 36 and commentators. 37 The premise underlying the
meaning given them by the departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation
and enforcement is given much weight." See also Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Falzon, 461 U.S. 1303
(O'Connor, C.J.).
33. U.S. courts have maintained, since 1797, that comity is a factor to be weighed whenever the
resolution of disputes affects other sovereign states. Societe Nationale, 107 S. Ct. 2542, 2555 n.27
(1987), citing Emory v. Grenough, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 369 (1797); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64
(1895).
The factors that a court should consider when engaging in comity analysis vary; no single set has
been found dispositive. In Hilton, the Court said comity analysis should give "due regard both to
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own [state's] citizens or of other persons"
under the state's protection. 159 U.S. at 163-64.
The RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 437
(1)(C) (Tent. Draft No. 7,1986) (approved May 14,1986) suggests that several relevant factors ought
to be considered when a court must decide whether to compel a foreign citizen to produce informa-
tion. These factors include the importance of the information sought, the specificity of the request,
where the information originated, alternative means of obtaining the same information, and whether
an order would hurt the interests of either the United States or the foreign state. Id.
The majority opinion in Societe Nationale, see infra note 48 and accompanying text, examined
both these statements of factors and concluded that comity analysis required a case by case determi-
nation of the relevant factors by the American courts. The majority declined to provide explicit
guidelines for this analysis. Societe Nationale, 107 S. Ct. 2542, 2554-556 (1987).
Justice Blackmun, on the other hand, established a tripartite test for courts to apply when deter-
mining whether comity requires first resort to the Hague Convention procedures. Id. at 2561-562
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The test requires a balance between the
foreign state's interest, interests of the United States, and the interest in a "well-functioning interna-
tional order." Id. See infra note 78 and accompanying text for Blackmun's balancing of the inter-
ests in Societe Nationale. See also infra note 82 for a balance struck by a federal court following
Blackmun's opinion.
34. Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd., 351 F. Supp. 702,707 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 485
F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
35. See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL AND J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF
AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 56, 58 (1967). There, the authors set forth a compre-
hensive set of principles designed to help clarify the goals and strategies of treaty interpretation.
They stress the importance of considering the entire range of events surrounding an agreement to
accurately interpret an agreement. Id. at 47. In a discussion of principles to be applied when in-
tepreting international agreements consistent with overriding goals, the "Principle of Subsequent
Conduct" is explained as one that
[t]ake[s] into account the whole sequence of acts of comunication and collaboration that
have occurred since the outcome phase [of the agreement]. Action by the parties in reli-
ance upon asserted or implicit intepretations during the course of performing an agreement
Washington University Open Scholarship
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principle is the belief that action taken by parties following an agreement
is an accurate indicator of shared expectations.38  Because the sources
mentioned in the foregoing paragraph-preparatory works, diplomatic
correspondence, negotiations, and convention purposes-may reflect
only one country's understanding of the agreement, equal weight should
be given to those same sources as viewed by other countries. 39 A treaty
represents, after all, the combined consent of sovereign states, each of
which is entitled to equal respect in the international community. 40
The United States Supreme Court has endorsed and relied upon inter-
is appropriately regarded as reliable evidence of shared subjectivities and may be given
priority over contradictory evidence even from the outcome phase.
Id. at 58-59 (emphasis added).
See also, C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAWv: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE
UNITED STATES 1471 (2d rev. ed. 1945) (proposing that "whatever be its form, evidence of the
signification attached by the parties to the terms of their compact should not be excluded from the
consideration of a tribunal charged with the duty of interpretation, citing Cameron Septic Tank Co.
v. Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39 0913)); S. CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT
383 (2d ed. 1916) (practical construction by the parties through proper means after a treaty's conclu-
sion is quite conclusive as to their meaning); Harvard Draft Convention on The Law of Treaties, Art.
19(a), reprinted in 29 Am J. Int'l L. 661 (Supp. Oct. 1935) (the subsequent conduct of the parties in
applying the treaty's provisions are to be considered).
37. See, eg., Comment, The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters: The Exclusive and Mandatory Procedures for Discovery Abroad, 132 U. PA. L.
REv. 1459, 1480 (1984).
38. Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert denied, 429 U.S. 890
(1976) (citing Maximov v. United States, 299 F.2d 565, 568 (2nd Cir. 1962), aff'd, 373 U.S. 49
(1963)). See also Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1986), Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2nd. Cir.),
cert denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977). Both Courts claimed that interpreting courts should give specific
words of a treaty meanings consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting parties.
39. The author does not suggest that the United States judiciary should not advance, as its
primary concern, the specific interests of the United States government when interpreting the scope
of a treaty. Presumably, however, American negotiators who partake in the drafting of such agree-
ments advance these precise interests and attempt to incorporate them into the text or meaning of
the agreement. When the negotiators fail to achieve this incorporation or decide that the best inter-
ests of the United States are not reflected in a compromise with other negotiating states, then one
should expect the United States not to enter into the agreement. Consequently, if American courts
desire to promote the interests of its government, all they should need to do is interpret the agree.
ment according to those principles that promote accurate interpretation, not those that inject addi-
tional interests of the United States. United States interests are already represented in the
agreement.
40. Fundamental principles of international law provide that an essential characteristic of a
"state" is sovereignty, i.e., the "supreme authority, which is independent of any other earthly au-
thority." L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 30-33, 170-72 (1905). Moreover,
sovereignty dictates that every state respect the right of every other state to exercise complete control
over its territory. Every state also has the right "to demand that other States abstain themselves, and
prevent their organs and subjects, from committing any act which contains a violation of its indepen-
dence and its territorial as well as personal supremacy." Id. at 171. From these well established
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss1/7
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pretations given international agreements by other signatories for nearly
100 years.41 Most recently, a unanimous Court, in Air France v. Saks,42
reaffirmed the importance of this principle when it interpreted provisions
of the Warsaw Convention and Montreal Agreement. The Court ex-
amined and found persuasive French case law and European legal schol-
arship in determining the meaning of a pivotal term in those
agreements.43 Justice O'Connor believed that subsequent conduct of
convention parties aided the Court in its decision and found "the opin-
ions of our sister signatories to be entitled to considerable weight."'
canons follows the conclusion that each state enjoys the same authority to manage its affairs in the
international community according to its discretion, especially when concluding treaties. Id.
Abstract principles governing international relations among equals are incorporated into many
international agreements, providing a second source supporting the proposition that because states
are equals it follows naturally that their interpretation of agreements as a signatory deserves equal
weight. Article 2 (1) of the United Nations Charter states, for example, that, "[t]he Organization is
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members." All the signatories to the Hague
Convention are also parties to the U.N. Charter, implying their adherence to the principle of
equality.
41. In Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 467 0891), the Supreme Court interpreted the interaction of
several different treaties between Japan and the United States respecting the authority of American
consuls in Japanese territory. The Court regarded the practical construction given the treaty by both
the United States and Japan to be of importance in their interpretation. Id. at 466-67. The Supreme
Court again relied on this interpretive tool in Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929) (interpreting the
Treaty of April 26, 1826 between the United States and Denmark). Five years later in Pigeon River
Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd, 291 U.S. 138 (1934), the Supreme Court
found the relevant clause of the Webster-Ashburtior Treaty ambiguous at best and therefore stated
that "it is appropriate that we should look to the practical construction which has been placed on it"
by both parties to the Convention. Id. at 153.
Other federal courts have also found the principle of referring to subsequent actions taken by
sister signatories to be an important factor when evaluating the meaning of an international agree-
ment. In Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1114 (1979), the Second Circuit examined a United Kingdom statute implementing the Warsaw
Convention and determined that evidence of how other convention signatories interpreted the Con-
vention to be "compelling." Id. at 918-19. Specifically, the court looked to both a statute enacted in
the United Kingdom designed to implement the convention and Canadian law. Id. See also Day v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1975) (conduct of parties subsequent to ratifica-
tion relevant to construe treaty); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Company, Ltd., 351 F. Supp. 702
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
42. 470 U.S. 392 0985).
43. Id. at 399-400, 404.
44. Id. at 404. (quoting Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 918 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979)).
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III. AMERICAN JUDICIAL INTEPRETATION OF THE HAGUE
EVIDENCE CONVENTION
Until 1987, interpretation of the Hague Convention by state and fed-
eral courts reflected conflicting views on whether the Convention's proce-
dures provided the exclusive,4 preferential,4 6 or optional47 method for
obtaining evidence abroad. Although foreign countries expressed dis-
pleasure with the confused interpretations, it was not until Societe Na-
tionale,4 8  that the Supreme Court clarified the Convention and
sanctioned optional use of its procedures.
In Societe Nationale, the plaintiffs49 brought suit in federal court
against two French corporations5' following an airplane crash in Iowa."1
The District Court exercised in personam jurisdiction over the foreign
corporations. 2 Initial discovery requests were answered by the French
corporations pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,5 3 not the
Hague Convention. When plaintiffs made a second request for docu-
ments under the Federal Rules the corporations sought a protective or-
der, claiming that the Hague Convention dictated exclusive use of its
provisions and that defendants could not comply with the request under
45. Eg., Worthington v. Polymer Machinery Corp., No. 83-2131 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 1984); Gil-
bert v. Josef Timmer Mfg. Co., No. CV 81-2340 (Ala. Cir. Ct. July 5, 1983); Rockwell Int'l Corp. v.
Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Augusta, S.P.S., No. 81-3984 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 1983); Cannon
v. Arburg Maschinenfabrik, No. 80-L-2275 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co. July 21, 1983).
46. E£g., General Electric Co. v. North Star Int'l Inc., No. 83-C-0830 (N.D. Il. Feb. 21, 1984);
Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58 (E.D.Pa. 1983); Vincent v. Ate-
lers de la Motobecane, 193 N.J. Super. 716, 475 A.2d 686 0984); Pierburg GmbH & Co. KG v.
Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1982).
47. E.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, 103 F.R.D. 42 (D.D.C. 1984);
Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Murphy v. Reifenhauser KG Mas-
chinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360 (D. Vt. 1984); Adidas (Canada) Ltd. v. SS Seatrain Bennington, No. 80
Civ. 1922-PNL (S.D.N.Y. May 29,1984); McKenna v. Fiat Societa per Azioni, No. 81-2676 (Pa. Ct.
C.P. July 20, 1983).
48. 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987).
49. Three separate suits were brought in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Iowa against the same manufacturer. The three cases were consolidated pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1982). Societe Nationale, 107 S. Ct. at 2546.
50. Plaintiffs sued two French corporations, Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, a cor-
poration owned by the French government, and Societe de Construction d'Avions de Tourism, a
wholly owned subsidiary of the former corporation. Societe Nationale, 107 S. Ct. at 2546 n.2.
51. Id. at 2546.
52. Apparently, the French corporation did not question the District Court's exercise ofjuris-
diction over them. Id.
53. Id. Plaintiffs requested documents from the French corporation under Rule 34(b) and ad-
missions under Rule 36. The corporation subsequently availed itself of the Federal Rules and re-
quested production by plaintiffs under Rules 26, 33 and 34. Id. at 2546 n.4.
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French law.54
The Magistrate denied the corporations' motion for the protective or-
der.55 In response to petitioners' concerns with violating French law, the
Magistrate balanced the United States' interest in protecting its citizens
from defective products against France's interest in protecting its coun-
try from overly intrusive discovery techniques.56 The Magistrate found
American interests compelling.57 Subsequently, petitioners sought a writ
of mandamus from the Eighth Circuit.58 The Court of Appeals denied
the petition59 and held that when a court exercises in personam jurisdic-
tion over a foreign litigant, the Hague Convention's procedures do not
apply."
On appeal, Justice Stevens, writing for a 5-4 majority, vacated and
remanded the court of appeals' judgment, holding that the procedures in
54. Id. at 2547. Defendants cited French Penal Code Law No. 80-538, reprinted in 75 AM. J.
INT'L LAW 382 (1981). See infra note 95 and accompanying text for the history, text, and scope of
the statute. Such foreign statutes prohibiting one of its nationals from complying with requests for
information from abroad are frequently termed "blocking statutes." Most often, these statutes make
it a criminal offense to comply with such requests when the information sought is believed by the
foreign government to be important to its security or sovereignty or if disclosure would be against
public policy. United States litigants confront these statutes most frequently in antitrust litigation.
See generally, Batista, Confronting Foreign "Blocking" Legislation: A Guide to Securing Disclosure
from Non-resident Parties to American Litigation, 17 INT. LAW. 61 (1983); Pettit and Styles, The
International Response to the Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus.
LAw. 697 (1982).
Courts tend to distinguish between their ability to compel a foreign litigant to comply with a
discovery request otherwise illegal under the foreign government's laws and their discretion to im-
pose penalties on foreign litigants who cannot or do not comply with the order. Most courts do not
deny their power to compel parties to American litigation to produce information; however, if the
faulting party pleads with his government in good faith to secure release of the information he will
not be penalized for failing to comply. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et
Commerciales, S.A., v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 211 (1958). See generally Note, Limitations on the
Federal Judicial Power to Compel Acts Violating Foreign Law, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1441, 1458 n.159
(1963),
55. 107 S. Ct. 2546.
56. Id. at 2547-548. The Magistrate noted that the French penal law did not appear to be
strictly enforced by the French government and questioned its applicability to the discovery requests
in question. Id. at 2547.
57. American interests were stronger, reasoned the Magistrate, because compliance with the
discovery requests did not involve recovering documents located in France. Id.
58. The corporations argued that the Hague Convention would be rendered meaningless if the
Magistrate's decision was upheld or the agreement's provisions were not resorted to in the first
instance. Id.
59. The court of appeals denied the writ of mandamus on grounds that the French corporations
had not yet failed to comply with the discovery order, thereby incurring liability for sanctions. Id. at
2548 & n.10.
60. Id. at 2547.
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the Convention are optional.61 The Court advanced four possible inter-
pretations of the treaty62 and applied traditional principles of interpreta-
tion63 to reject all but one alternative. The Court examined the
negotiating history' and text of the treaty. It found that, because the
language used was permissive and made no indication that the parties
meant the treaty to be mandatory, the procedures were "unambiguously"
optional.65 The Court reasoned that if the terms were to be read as
mandatory, the result would be to impair the jurisdiction of American
courts and place American parties at a disadvantage vis-a-vis foreign
parties.66
61. Id. at 2551 & n.20. Although the precise holding is unclear, the Court enunciated four
possible interpretations of the agreement and eliminated the first three. Such action implies that the
fourth holds. See infra note 62. Justice Stevens stated: "We therefore decline to hold as a blanket
matter that comity requires resort to Hague Evidence Convention procedures without prior scrutiny
in each case of the particular facts, sovereign interests, and liklihood that resort to those procedures
will prove effective." Id. at 2555-556.
62. The four interpretations cover the possible relationships between the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Hague Convention: (1) The treaty's procedures are the exclusive means of re-
questing evidence located abroad; (2) the treaty dictates resort to its procedures in the first instance,
but is not the exclusive means; (3) the treaty's provisions supplement federal discovery rules,
although comity requires resort to those provisions in the first instance; and (4) the treaty's provi-
sions are optional, but should be used when trial courts deem it appropriate after examining the
particular circumstances and interests of the foreign state. Id. at 2550.
63. The majority looked to the history of the treaty, its negotiations, and practical construction
of the text and stated that the "practical construction adopted by the parties" may also be relevant.
Id. (citing Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985); Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States,
318 U.S. 423, 431-432 (1943)). However, the Court did not adequately consider the interpretations
of other countries revealed in their subsequent action. See infra note 73.
64. The Court found particularly persuasive the President's letter of transmittal to the Senate
supporting ratification. 107 S. Ct. at 2549. See supra note 18 and accompanying text for text of the
letter and a discussion of the circumstances surrounding its transmittal.
65. 107 S. Ct. at 2553. Article 1 of the agreement states that a contracting state may issue
letters of request to signatory states. Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 1. The majority found
this particularly persuasive, especially in light of the mandatory language in Article I of the Hague
Service Convention. 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638 (signatory states shall apply in all cases). 107
S. Ct. at 2550 n.15.
66. The majority feared that every time an American court exercised jurisdiction over a foreign
citizen or needed access to foreign documents, it would become subject to the internal laws of a
foreign country. .1d. at 2553. Justice Stevens, quoting In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 612
(1985), believed that courts should not attribute mandatory meaning to the Hague Convention ab-
sent an explicit statement of intent on the face of the document. 107 S. Ct. at 2553. Moreover, a
mandatory construction would have three unacceptable effects on American litigants: (1) in litiga-
tion between American nationals and foreign nationals, the former would be relegated to the proce-
dures in the Hague Convention, while the latter would enjoy liberal discovery under the Federal
Rules; (2) foreign companies would therefore have an unfair competitive advantage over domestic
companies; and (3) foreign nationals of a contracting state would be unfairly pitted against nationals
of any other state. Id. at 2553-554 n.25.
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The Court also rejected petitioners' alternative argument that litigants
should utilize the Convention procedures in the first instance. This rule,
Stevens observed, would be inconsistent with the interest of "just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination" of disputes.67 In addition, the Court
found no textual support for a "first resort" rule.68 The Court concluded
that the interests of comity dictate that a case by case analysis be used to
accurately balance the interests of two sovereign states.69 Thus, the ma-
jority espoused a rule of case-by-case scrutiny of the conflicting interests,
with the "exact line between reasonableness and unreasonableness" to be
drawn by the trial court.7° However, the Court failed to provide specific
rules to guide the lower courts.71 Finally, the majority indicated that the
burden of persuasion falls on the party seeking to invoke the provisions
of the Hague Convention.72
In reaching its conclusions, the Court made only passing mention of
the interpretations of other signatory states as revealed by their subse-
quent actions.73
In a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice
Blackmum criticized the majority's analysis and advocated resort to the
Convention in the first instance.74 Blackmun believed that the majority
ignored the importance of the Convention and "failed to provide lower
67 Id. at 2555, quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
68 107 S. Ct. at 2555.
69. Id. at 2555-557.
70, Id. at 2556.
71. Id. at 2557.
72. Id. at 2557 n.30 ("The District Court may therefore require... that [the] party [urging
resort to the treaty] bear the burden .. "). See infra, notes 85, 88-89 for post-Societe Nationale
cases supporting this interpretation of the Court's opinion.
73. The majority did acknowledge in footnote l Ithe position taken by the Republic of France
in its amicus curiae brief. The opinion does not take into consideration action taken by other signa-
tories other than the existence of blocking statutes such as the French Penal Code Law No. 80-53 8
which was the subject of this litigation. The majority's failure to apply the Principle of Subsequent
Conduct could imply any one of several possible conclusions. The Court may simply have reasoned
it unnecessary to address the concerns advanced by signatory states in their briefs, or the Court may
have felt such an analysis would be duplicative of analysis already performed by the executive
branch and congressmen when signing the treaty. If the former conclusion is correct, then the Court
essentially disregarded any foreign signatory's interest in the outcome of a decision having a direct
impact on their internal law. If the latter conclusion is correct, then the majority weighed American
interests twice, once in the negotiation process and once in the case, whereas foreign interests are
considered only at the treaty negotiation stage. Such an interpretation tips the scales in favor of the
United States. Either way, the majority's conclusion inevitably results in a skewed interpretation.
74. 107 S. Ct. at 2558. Blackmun's opinion, unlike the majority's, accounts for subsequent
action by signatory countries, albeit as a consideration of comity rather than as an independent
factor. See supra note 73.
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courts with any meaningful guidance for carrying out" a case by case
inquiry. 75 Furthermore, by sanctioning an ad hoc approach, the majority
mandated a re-balancing of competing national interests by the district
courts. These interests already had been balanced by the various drafters
of the Convention.76
Blackmun also set forth definitive guidelines for the lower courts to
follow in determining whether first resort to the Hague Convention is
appropriate.77 First, a court should determine whether a conflict does in
fact exist between domestic and foreign law. If this threshhold question
is answered in the affirmative, then the court should engage in a tripartite
analysis designed to reconcile the disparate national concerns.78 The
analysis requires consideration of American interests, foreign interests,
and the "mutual interests of all nations in a smoothly functioning inter-
national legal regime.",79
In the wake of Societe Nationale, courts remain divided on the proper
application of the case-by-case analysis mandated by the Supreme Court.
75. Id. Blackmun's concern with the methodology suggested by the Court focused on the "risk
that ... case-by-case comity analysis... [would] be performed inadequately" and that courts will
not use the Hague Convention because of their unfamiliarity with its procedures. Id. Moreover, the
interests of the United States are furthered by promoting use of the Convention's procedures in the
first instance: the civil law countries had everything to lose and the U.S. had everything to gain
during the drafting of the agreement. Id. at 2559. Consequently, "[u]nless they had expected the
Convention to provide the normal channels for discovery, other parties to the Convention would
have had no incentive to agree to its terms." Id.
Blackmun agreed with the majority, however, in rejecting the two extreme positions regarding use
of the Convention's procedures. The Hague Convention applies to third parties in addition to the
litigants and it cannot be considered the exclusive means for obtaining evidence abroad. Id. at 2558.
76. This double balancing would result, continued Blackmun, in second guessing the executive
branch's balance of competing national interests-a purely political determination. Id. at 2560.
Blackmun observed that "diplomatic and executive channels are, by definition, designed to ex-
change, negotiate, and reconcile the problems which accompany the realization of national interests
within the sphere of international association." Id. (citing Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian
World Airlines, 235 F.2d 909, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). Judges, on the other hand, lack the experience
necessary to make such policy choices and may exhibit a pro-forum bias. Id. at 2560.
77. Blackmun declared, "[c]omity is not just a vague political concern favoring international
cooperation when it is in our interest to do so. Rather, it is a principle under which judicial decisions
reflect the systematic value of reciprocal tolerance and goodwill." Id. at 2561.
78. Id. at 2561-562.
79. Id. Blackmun compared this analysis to that performed in choice of law decisions. Id. at
2562 n. 11. Interests of the United States, under Blackmun's analysis, include providing litigants
with effective procedures to acquire evidence abroad, fair and equal treatment of litigants, and assur-
ing mutually advantageous procedures between foreign and domestic litigants. Id. at 2564-567.
When examining the interests of foreign states, emphasis should be placed on state sovereignty.
Sovereignty includes the power to control the exercise of foreign authority in the state and protection
of the substantive rights of a state's citizenry. Id. at 2562-563.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss1/7
1989] HAGUE CONVENTION & U.S. COURTS
In Hudson v. Hermann Pfauter GmbH & Co.,8 the Northern District of
Illinois granted a foreign corporation's motion for a protective order re-
quiring plaintiffs to serve discovery requests pursuant to the Hague Con-
vention." The court acknowleged the majority's holding in Societe
Nationale, but incorporated Blackmun's tripartite analysis to conclude
that principles of comity dictated resort to the Convention's procedures
in the first instance.82 The court determined that "the burden of proof is
placed on the party opposing the use of Convention procedures to
demonstrate that those procedures would frustrate [American] inter-
ests."83 Moreover, inconveniences due to unfamiliarity with the Conven-
tion will not satisfy the burden of proof.84
In contrast to Hudson, several other courts view the Societe Nationale
decision as requiring the party seeking utilization of the Hague Conven-
tion to demonstrate why resort to its procedures would be effective. In
Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm Corp.,5 the court ordered the defendant, a
80. 117 F.R.D. 33 (N.D. Ill. 1987). In Hudson, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of an alleg-
edly defective machine under negligence and strit liability theories. The manufacturer, a corpora-
tion formed under West German law, objected to interrogatories served upon it pursuant to Rule 33
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The manufacturer refused to comply with the request
unless made under Hague Convention procedures. Plaintiffs refused to comply with the opposing
party's request. Subsequently, the defendant moved for a protective order. Id. at 34-35.
81. Id. at 40.
82. Id. The court's decision is strikingly similar to Justice Blackmun's Societe Nationale con-
currence. The tripartite comity analysis, as applied by the district court, considered generalized
interests potentially applicable to any factual situation. If the tripartite analysis lends itself to bal-
ancing generalized interests, as opposed to individualized interests, then it is difficult to conceive of
situations in which the balance would not tip in favor of using Convention procedures.
The Hudson court noted the Supreme Court's failure to provide guidance for determining when a
court should require compliance with the Convention. Id. at 36. The court first examined factors
determined by scholars and justices to be relevant when weighing competing interests: factors
promulgated in the RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 40 0965) as well as those set forth by Blackmun in his Societe Nationale opinion. Id. at 36.
The Restatement's approach, according to the court, emphasized interests of the individual litigants
whereas Blackmun's approach focused less on individual interests "except to the extent they are
subsumed by the interests of the sovereigns involved." Id. at 37. The court found Blackmun's
tripartite analysis to be the preferred framework. Id.
83. Id. at 38. The court cited no authority for placing this burden on the requesting party. The
statement seems to indicate that the court supports Blackmun's ultimate conclusion that resort
should be made to the Convention in the first instance. Blackmun did acknowledge, however, that
circumstances might arise when United State litigants would be put at an unfair disadvantage against
foreign litigants if forced to make use of the Convention's procedures. Societe Nationale, 107 S. Ct.
2542, 2567-568 (1987).
84. Hudson, 117 F.R.D. at 38. The court reasoned that as judges become more familiarized
with the Convention, its procedures may become as effective as American procedure. Id.
85. 118 F.R.D. 386 (D.N.J. 1987).
Washington University Open Scholarship
258 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
foreign corporation, to respond to discovery requests made pursuant to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 6 The court expressly disagreed
with the Hudson court's analysis87 and required the foreign litigants to
prove that the sovereign interests implicated in the dispute required ad-
herence to the Convention. Likewise, the court in Haynes v.
Kleinwefersl8 limited the Hudson decision to its facts and required the
defendant to show "cognent reasons" why the Convention should be
employed. 9
These decisions, if indicative of how other courts will interpret Societe
Nationale, accentuate the uncertainty created by the opinion. Depending
upon the court, foreign litigants may or may not be able to rely upon
Convention procedures and American litigants may or may not be forced
to adhere to the Convention procedures. This result is particularly ironic
in light of the signatories' intent to provide for a uniform rule of gather-
ing evidence.
IV. SUBSEQUENT CONDUCT BY SIGNATORIES TO THE HAGUE
CONVENTION AS EVIDENCE OF EXCLUSIVITY:
LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL AND EXECUTIVE
INTERPRETATIONS
Response by signatory states to the Hague Convention was slow be-
cause, although the treaty opened for signature in 1970, few states depos-
ited their instruments of ratification prior to 1980.90 As a result, few
opportunities for interpretation occurred prior to 1980.91
The United States' discovery rules are considered the most lenient of
those countries which are parties to the Convention. 92 Two conse-
quences follow from this well accepted premise. First, most disputes in
foreign countries involve an American litigant attempting to obtain pre-
86. Id. at 392.
87. The court believed that the Hudson decision placed too much emphasis on Blackmun's
concurring opinion and improperly disregarded the majority's opinion. Id. at 384.
88. 119 F.R.D. 335 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
89. See also In Re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 838 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1988) (declining to give
district court guidance in its determination of the applicability of the Convention) (on remand from
the Supreme Court for a decision in light of Societe Nationale).
90. Those states that deposited instruments of ratification prior to 1980 included Czechoslova-
kia, the United States, Luxemburg, Singapore, and Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Hague
Convention, supra note 1.
91. In the United States, however, litigation over the use of Convention procedures began
shortly after ratification in 1972.
92. See supra note I.
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trial discovery of foreign nationals. Second, several countries have en-
acted legislation to curb overly intrusive "fishing expeditions"93 con-
ducted by American litigants.
A. Foreign "Blocking" Legislation
Signatories to the Hague Evidence Convention deposit with the
Netherlands instruments of ratification as well as any declarations and
reservations made under the Convention.94 Several states who are parties
to the treaty have enacted "blocking" legislation. Two frequently liti-
gated examples will be examined below.
1. France
In 1980, France, a civil law country, enacted the penal law relating to
the communication of economic, commercial, industrial, financial, or
technical documents or information to foreign natural or legal persons
("Law").95 The impetus for passage in the French Senate included evi-
dence that American litigants were, in large part, disregarding the proce-
dures in the Hague Convention 96 and specific instances of American
courts seeking discovery of pre-trial documents.97 The French Assembly
also hoped the Law would hinder enforcement of American antitrust
laws sufficiently to force referral of disputes to government negotiators.98
However, the Assembly report noted that it was uncertain whether an
American court would recognize a claim under the Law as grounds for
non-compliance with a discovery order.99
93. The term "fishing expedition" refers to discovery requests made by American courts for
"material which might lead to the obtaining of evidence." Rio Tinto Zinc v. Westinghouse Elec.,
[1978] 1 All E.R. 434, 453 (Viscount Dilhorne). Perhaps the most cited example of a fishing expedi-
tion conducted in England is the request made by an American court in Radio Corp. of America v.
Rauland Corp., [1956] 1 Q.B. 618. There, the request for production included any documents which
are "relevant and material to the issues pending in the suit." Id. at 626.
The French have also made clear their disdain of the overly broad requests for discovery made by
American courts. See Toms, The French Response to Extraterritorial Application of United States
Antitrust Laws, 15 INT'L LAW 585, 596 n.41. (1981).
94. Hague Convention, supra note 7, arts. 39-42.
95. French Penal Code Law No. 80-538, reprinted in 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 382 (1981). The
Supreme Court examined this law in Societe Nationale, 107 S. Ct. 2542, 2546 n.6, 2556 n.2, (1987).
For an excellent legislative history of the statute see Toms, supra note 93, at 588-90.
96. Current Developments, The 1980 French Law on Documents and Information, 75 AM. J.
INT'L L. 382, 382 (1981).
97. Id.
98. Toms, supra note 93, at 590.
99. Id.
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Article 1 of the Law prohibits transmission of economic, commercial,
or financial information to foreign authorities when transmission would
threaten French interests, unless it is required by an international agree-
ment."° Conversely, Article 1 bis prohibits any person from requesting
such information for use in a foreign judicial proceeding unless an inter-
national agreement provides otherwise.10 1 Other sections of the Law re-
quire persons who are asked to supply such information to notify the
relevant ministry"°2 and impose penalties for violators of Articles 1 and 1
bis.103
As one commentator observed, stricter standards apply to information
sought for the purpose of foreign judicial or administrative proceedings
(Article 1 bis) than information sought by foreign public authorities
without a view to judicial proceedings (Article 1).104 Article 1 only pro-
hibits discovery of information that threatens sovereignty interests,
whereas Article 1 bis contains a blanket exclusion of all information
sought for judicial and administrative procedures. Additionally, the Law
will result in a greater reluctance on the part of French nationals to coop-
erate with foreign states, even when a foreign state may exercise effective
jurisdiction over the individuals and the information sought. Such resist-
ance will impair further the already limited procedures for taking evi-
dence abroad.
Clearly, the purposes of the French Assembly include a desire to com-
mand greater respect for and use of the traditional means for taking evi-
dence in France. 105 At the same time, the Law requires compliance with
the otherwise prohibited requests if the foreign party seeks the informa-
tion pursuant to the Convention.106 This indicates France's satisfaction
with the treaty procedures specifically agreed to by its negotiators.
Therefore, ratification of the Hague Convention by France indicates that
100. French Penal Law No. 80-538, art. 1, reprinted in 75 AM. J. INT'L L.. 382 (1981).
101. Id., art. 1 bis.
102. Id., art. 2.
103. Id., art. 3. Penalties range from two to six months imprisonment to 10,000 to 120,000
francs in fines, or both. Id.
104. Current Developments, The 1980 French Law on Documents and Information, 75 AM. J.
INT'L L. 382 0981).
105. See generally Borel & Boyd, Opportunities for and Obstacles to Obtaining Evidence in France
for Use in Litigation in the United States, 13 INT'L LAW. 35 (1979).
106. See Current Developments, supra note 104, at 385 (purposes of Article 1 bis include prohib-
iting foreign lawyers from engaging in "legal tourism," preventing the collection of valuable French
information in foreign states, and the renegotiation of the Hague Convention).
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procedures other than those traditionally utilized in France or those in
the Convention will not be acceptable to the French Assembly.
2. United Kingdom
England, a common law country, 10 7 enacted two pieces of legislation
designed to implement the Hague Convention. These include The Evi-
dence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act of 1975 and the Protec-
tion of Trading Interests Act of 1980.108 Both limit the extent to which
foreign states may request and obtain information located in the United
Kingdom.
The Evidence Act of 1975 sets out a comprehensive code for courts in
the United Kingdom taking evidence on behalf of other courts.' 9 The
Preliminary Note to the Act explicitly states that some provisions are
enacted to enable ratification of the Hague Convention. 110 The relevant
provisions of the Act provide that when a foreign state requests evidence
from an English court, the court shall have the power to order compli-
ance with the request, provided the request is made on behalf of a foreign
court and is sought for the purpose of a civil proceeding.' In addition
to these conditions precedent, English courts use their discretion when
drafting orders in response to foreign discovery requests. 1 2 The courts
will not grant an order for pre-trial discovery,"' grant general discovery
requests,114 or require persons to give evidence that would prejudice the
security of the United Kingdom."'
107. As in the United States, England's judicial process is adversarial and the parties to the
litigation gather the evidence for use at trial. See supra note 14 for a discussion of the pertinent
differences between discovery conducted in civil and common law states.
108. See Pettit & Styles, The International Response to the Extraterritorial Application of United
States Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus. LAw. 697, 699-704 (1982) for an in-depth look at the legislative
history of both acts.
109. Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975, Preliminary Note (1975 ch. 34).
110. Id.
111. Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act of 1975, § 1 (1975 ch. 34).
112. Id. § 2 (I).
113. The United Kingdom, pursuant to Article 23 of the Hague Convention, declared that it will
not execute Letters of Request seeking discovery of pre-trial evidence. 8 MARTINDALE HUBBEL
LAW DIRECTORY, SELECTED INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS (pt. VII) 23 (1987).
114. Section 2(4) of the Evidence Act of 1975 states that an order from a court shall not require a
person to disclose what documents may be in his possession which are relevant to the proceedings, or
to produce documents other than those specifically requested in the letter of request that are in his
possession.
115. The Secretary of State has discretionary power to issue a certificate stating that evidence
given pursuant to the Act would be prejudicial. This certificate constitutes conclusive evidence of
that fact. Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act of 1975, § 3(1)(3) (1975 ch. 34).
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Five years after passage of the 1975 Evidence Act, Parliament enacted
the Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980.116 The Trading Act ef-
fects a further narrowing of discovery procedures allowed by the English
government.1 17 This narrowing was designed to thwart efforts by Ameri-
can litigants to obtain, via long-arm statutes, information pertaining to
English commerce. 118
The Trading Act provides the Secretary of State with increased, indeed
almost complete, discretionary authority over information requests made
by foreign states. Section 2 of the Act provides that if the Secretary of
State discovers that a foreign tribunal has required a citizen of the United
Kingdom to produce commercial information to a court, or may have to
produce such information, the Secretary may prohibit compliance. 119
The Secretary may only prohibit compliance, however, if it infringes on
the United Kingdom's sovereignty or threatens the United Kingdom's
security or foreign relations. 120
Taken together, these two statutes effectively prevent the United States
from utilizing any method of discovery other than those provided for in
the Hague Convention. Moreover, the two statutes prevent certain infor-
mation from leaving the country when the Secretary of State finds it
either infringes on the United Kingdom's jurisdiction or is prejudicial to
its interests. The Convention, on the other hand, permits non-compli-
ance with a discovery request only when the recipient state considers the
request prejudicial to its security or sovereignty. 1 2  Hence, the extent to
which the English may refuse to execute a discovery request under its
own laws exceeds its power to refuse a request issued pursuant to the
Convention. 122
116. Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980, 1980 Chapter 11, reprinted in B.A. RISTAu,
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE (CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL) 1-7 (1986 Supp. & rev., 1980
Supp., no. 1).
117. According to Pettit & Styles, this legislation marks the "high water mark of English juris-
dictional protectionism." Pettit & Styles, supra note 108, at 701.
118. Id.
119. Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980, supra note 116, § 1.
120. Id. § 2.
121. Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 12(b).
122. For additional background on the 1975 and 1980 English Acts, see generally Batista, Con-
fronting Foreign "Blocking" Legislation: A Guide to Securing Disclosure from Non-resident Parties to
American Litigation, 17 INT'L LAW. 61(1983); Huntley, Some Jurisdictional Aspects of Enforcement
of Antitrust Laws, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 213 (1981); Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction,
75 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981); Comment, Antitrust Suits Involving Foreign Commerce: Suggestions
for Procedural Reform, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (1987).
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The English legislative response indicates a belief on the part of the
government that the procedures provided by the Hague Convention
should be followed. Traditionally, the United Kingdom has allowed
broad discovery requests within its territory by virtue of its common law
principles. As demonstrated by the limited nature of its implementing
statutes, the United Kingdom interprets the Convention to provide the
preferred methods for seeking information located within its territories.
B. Foreign Judicial Interpretation of the Convention
No other signatory has litigated the Hague Convention's applicability
to discovery requests as frequently as the United States. Significant case
law does exist, however, in the United Kingdom and the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, two of the first countries to ratify the Convention.
L United Kingdom
In Rio Tinto Zinc v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,123 the House of
Lords reviewed two letters of request issued by the Eastern District of
Virginia pursuant to the Convention. The letters, by request of defend-
ant Westinghouse, sought examination of former directors and employ-
ees of a British corporation and production of documents located in
England.124 The British nationals appealed from an English Court of
Appeals order executing the letters of request, claiming such discovery
exceeded the permissible scope of the 1975 Evidence Act.1 25
The court held that, in the spirit of the 1975 Evidence Act, the letters
should be executed to the greatest extent possible. Although Lord Wil-
berforce recognized the range of documents requested "undoubtedly ex-
tend into areas, access to which is forbidden by English law,"1 26 the
request included some specific documents that conformed to the 1975
Act. 127 Consequently, the letter of request for production of documents
was upheld, but only to the extent permitted under the English imple-
123. [1978] 1 All E.R. 434.
124. Id. at 440.
125. See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
126. 1 All E.R. at 443.
127. Id. Lord Wilberforce examined the practice of "blue penciling," a technique used by the
court of appeals to narrow the scope of the initial request as is permitted under § 2 of the 1975 Act.
The Lord stated he would "have applied the blue pencil still more vigorously so as to leave in the
schedule only 'particular documents specified' together with replies to letters where replies must be
sent." Id.
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menting statute. 128
In In re Norway's Application, 29 the English Court of Appeals ex-
amined a letter of request issued by a Norwegian court to an English
high court, requesting oral examination of two witnesses residing in the
United Kingdom. 30 A duly appointed master granted the applica-
tion.' 3' On appeal, the witnesses claimed that the English court lacked
jurisdiction to comply with the request 132 and, alternatively, that the
court should use its discretion and deny the request. 133
The Court of Appeals found that the legal proceeding in Norway con-
stituted a civil matter under either state's laws.' 34 Therefore, the high
court had proper jurisdiction under the 1975 Evidence Act to comply
with the letter of request. 135 In addition, the court recognized, as a mat-
ter of public policy, that English courts would not ordinarily assist in the
enforcement of foreign revenue laws.' 36 However, compliance with the
request would not offend either public policy or comity where the request
was supported by both parties to the Norwegian litigation. 137 The court
affirmed the grant of application for the above reasons.
128. Five separate opinions were written for this decision, including two dissenting opinions
expressing the view that the request for documents should not be executed. Viscount Dilhorne,
relying on the United Kingdom's declaration that it would not execute letters issued for the purpose
of pre-trial discovery, concluded that the documents requested were of a "fishing character." Id. at
454. After so characterizing the request, Dilhorne refused to look at the types of documents re-
quested, but rather looked only to the purposes for which they were sought. Lord Fraser of Tul-
lybelton also expressed the view that the order should be reversed. Id. at 471. Fraser believed the
documents sought were not evidence and therefore outside the parameters for discovery under the
1975 Act. Id.
129. [1986] 3 W.L.R. 452.
130. Id. at 452. Both Norway and the United Kingdom are signatories to the Hague Conven-
tion. The letters of request issued by Norway complied with Convention procedures. Id.
131. Under § 1 of the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act of 1975, the state, upon
receipt of a letter of request, refers the application to a master who makes the initial decision to grant
or deny the request. In this case, the master granted the request, but on review the high court
modified the master's order, narrowing the scope of questions to be asked of the witnesses. Id. at
457.
132. The witnesses argued that, because the proceeding taking place in Norway involved estate
taxes, the legal process was not technically a civil or commercial matter within the meaning of §§ 1
and 9(l) of the 1975 Evidence Act. Id. at 457.
133. Id. at 456-57.
134. Id. at 465.
135. Id. at 472.
136. Id. at 480.
137. Id. at 481. The court suggested that if one party to the foreign litigation opposed a request
for tax information, then the English courts would be obliged to refuse the request on grounds of
public policy. Id.
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In J Barber & Sons v. Lloyds,138 a United States court sought, through
a letter of request executed pursuant to Hague Convention procedures,
evidence from defendants residing in England. Furthermore, the United
States court wanted the evidence recorded on videotape. 39 The Queen's
Bench stated that videotaping of evidence is not traditionally allowed in
English courts. However, the court should normally employ the re-
quested method unless it is excessively inconsistent with established pro-
cedures. In that case a court, in its discretion, should disallow the
request. 1' ° Finally, the court noted that England's 1975 Evidence Act
and the Hague Convention "make it clear that the underlying principle is
that the English court should be sympathetic to the request of the foreign
court."
14 1
Finally, in MacKinnon v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities
Corp.,142 two parties to an English case obtained an ex parte order and
subpoena to compel a non-party American bank to produce information
located in New York. 143 The English court discharged both the order
and subpoena against the bank, finding them to be an infringement of the
sovereignty and banking laws of the United States. 44 The court noted
that "the first and more orthodox route would be to apply to a master...
for the issue of letters of request to the courts of New York," or to com-
ply with American procedure through a New York court. 145
Thus the English courts have interpreted the Hague Convention and
their own implementing legislation as providing the preferred procedures
for taking evidence within their territory, as well as for use by English
138. [1987] 1 Q.B. 103. A Queen's Bench proceeding is a trial in the first instance, akin to an
American trial court.
139. An attempt to secure the evidence willingly from the defendants proved unsuccessful due to
the defendants' belief that the taping of evidence was not a permissible method of recordation under
English procedure. Id. at 103.
140. The court recognized that the demeanor of the witnesses had become important and,
although videotaping is generally prohibited by English procedure, videotape had been utilized in
certain instances and, consequently, the procedure was not excessively inconsistent with established
principles. Id.
141. Id. at 104.
142. [1986] 1 Ch. 482.
143. Id. at 490.
144. Id. at 493-94. The court found ironic that the principle espoused-used here to protect an
American national-was the direct result of excessive American discovery practices against British
nationals.
145. The court also praised the United States District Court's decision in Laker Airways, Ltd. v.
Pan American World Airways, 607 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), which held that the provisions of
the Hague Convention should be resorted to in the first instance. [1986] 1 Ch. at 496.
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nationals abroad. The House of Lords and the lower trial and appellate
courts all mandate that foreign courts use the procedures outlined in the
Evidence Act of 1975. Although the courts promote the purpose of facili-
tating the taking of evidence, they are not hesitant to find that requests
deviating from the settled procedures are unenforceable.
2. The Federal Republic of Germany
To date, only one case has arisen in the West German courts regarding
a request for judicial assistance under the Hague Convention. In Corning
Glass Works v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp.,146 the Dis-
trict Court for Western District of Virginia issued a letter of request, in
accordance with Convention procedures, to a West German Ministry re-
questing examination of witnesses and production of documents.1 47 The
Ministry complied with the request for oral examination, but denied the
document production request. 148
Both the grant of oral examination and denial of document production
were appealed to the Oberlandesgericht 149 by the affected parties. The
court affirmed the examination order, finding that the letter could be exe-
cuted even though the procedure for transmitting the request was defec-
tive. 150 Had the request for evidence been issued through means other
than the Convention, the court indicated the request might not be exe-
cuted because the requested procedures are otherwise unwarranted under
German law.' 5 '
In making its decision, the court stated that the "guiding principle
mandating this result is the desire of... Germany to place judicial assist-
146. No. 9 VA 4/80 (Munich Ct. App. Nov. 27, 1980) (petition for review of an administrative
ruling under §§ 23 et seq., E66VF, judgment of June 2, 1980 issued in File No. 9341-E-Ia-403/80).
reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 1025 (1981).
147. Id. at 1027. The text of the letter is reprinted in the opinion. Id. at 1040.
148. Id. at 1028. The Ministry denied the request for documents because the American court
sought discovery of pre-trial documents which the Federal Republic of Germany declared it would
not honor pursuant to Article 23 of the Hague Convention. Id.
149. The Oberlandesgericht is West Germany's Higher Regional Court. The court treated each
appeal in a separate opinion.
150. Id. at 1032-35. Petitioners urged the court to overturn the order granting depositions on
grounds of procedural impropriety. They urged the following violations: (1) the letter was not
transmitted directly to the Bavarian Ministry, (2) the witnesses' addresses were missing from the
letter of request, and (3) the questions to be asked of the witnesses were not furnished. 20 I.L.M. at
1032-35. The court rejected these defects because the first two were inconsequential and the third
could be remedied by allowing examination of the witnesses only with regard to the documents
specifically included in the request. Id.
151. Id. at 1037.
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ance with the United States on a solid treaty basis, as was done in the
Convention, and thereby take due account of the procedural device of
pre-trial discovery," otherwise unknown in Germany.15 2 The court re-
jected the contention that the information sought was not intended for
use in any prospective legal proceeding as required by Article 1(2) of the
Hague Convention. Pre-trial discovery in America, the court correctly
observed, presupposes a prospective legal proceeding and is intended to
disclose evidence for use at trial.153
In a separate opinion, the court also affirmed the Ministry's decision
refusing discovery of documents.' 54 The documents were requested for
the purpose of pre-trial discovery. Not only had Germany declared it
would refuse to honor requests for such documents, but the administra-
tive regulations authorized by the German implementing statute, which
might permit such production under certain conditions, had not yet been
promulgated.155
The Corning decision indicates that the German courts interpret the
Hague Convention as more than an advisory treaty. 156 The court clearly
reads the treaty as providing the procedural minima for foreign courts
requesting evidence in West Germany and therefore permitting nothing
else or less until specifically recognized in its implementing legislation.
C. Official Government Positions of Signatory States
Traditionally, foreign governments communicate with one another
through their State Departments or the equivalent thereof. As a conse-
quence, the United States Supreme Court, when confronted with interna-
152. Id. at 1036.
153. Id. at 1039.
154. No. 9 VA 3/80 (Munich Ct. App. Oct. 31, 1980) (petition for review of an administrative
ruling under §§ 23 et seq., E66VG, judgement of June 2, 1980 issued in File No. 9341 E-Ia-403/80),
reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 1049 (1981).
155. Id. at 1053. The court carefully circumscribed the question of when discovery of pre-trial
documents might be allowed. The court declared:
It need not be decided in the present case whether execution of an American request for
judicial assistance seeking not only documents but also other evidence at the discovery
stage might be denied, irrespective of the [German] declaration under Article 23 of the
Convention, because it constitutes a fishing expedition which is inadmissible under German
procedural law, or else because it violates a substantive or procedural tenet of German
ordre public....
Id. at 1055.
156. See also Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa, 107 S. Ct. 2543, 2550 0987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) ("[the Convention] cannot be viewed as merely advisory").
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tional conflicts, typically defers to the United States State Department. 15 7
The State Department altered the system slighty in 1978 by declaring that
it would no longer transmit diplomatic notes from foreign states to the
Supreme Court. 158 Rather, foreign governments are now encouraged to
make their interests in American litigation known through the filing of
an amicus curiae brief. 59
These briefs, because they are now the favored means by which a for-
eign state officially expresses its position on international matters subject
to judicial resolution, should be viewed by the Court as accurate indica-
tors of a foreign state's interpretation of the Convention. Thus, a discus-
sion of the positions so expressed by signatory states is in order.160
L England and Northern Ireland
Writing in support of the petitioners in Societe Nationale, the govern-
ment of the United Kingdom expressed its view that, although the Hague
Convention is not the exclusive means of gathering evidence abroad,
courts should respect a signatory state's requirement that Convention
157. Although this practice occurs when courts interpret international agreements, it prevails
most frequently in conflicts involving sovereign immunity of states. For an example of the State
Department's influence, see supra note 8.
158. Dept. of State File No. P76 0101-2129, reprinted in 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 124 (1979).
159. This new method was believed to be a more effective means for a foreign state to express its
views. Id. at 125.
Evidently, at first, the change in procedure did not go over well with the courts. In In re Uranium
Anti-Trust Litigation, Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir.
1980), the Seventh Circuit expressed shock that the defendants' governments submitted amicus
briefs. Subsequently, the Department of State wrote to the Associate Attorney General, requesting
that he clarify the Department's position for the court. Letter to Associate Attorney General,
March 17, 1980, reprinted in 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 665, 666 0980). Finally, on May 6, 1980, Associate
Attorney General Shenefield made a formal statement of interest on behalf of the United States to
the Seventh Circuit. Commenting on the numerous concerns of foreign countries regarding the
exercise of United States jurisdictional authority outside the United States territories, Shenefleld
declared: "The views and representations advanced by these foreign governments are entitled to
appropriate deference and weight in resolving legal questions that turn, at the least in part, on con-
siderations of international comity." Dept. of State File No. P80-0108-2005, reprinted in 74 AM. J.
INT'L L. 928, 929 (1980).
160. Several amicus briefs were filed with the Supreme Court in Societe Nationale prior to oral
argument. The only states submitting briefs who are signatories to the Convention were France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom. Other briefs were filed by Switzerland, the Italy-America
Chamber of Commerce, the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, the
United States and the Securities and Exchange Commission, and Compania Gijonesa de Navigacion,
S.A. All the briefs were submitted in support of petitioners except the brief by Gijonesa de
Navigacion.
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procedures be regarded as the mandatory method.16 t The United King-
dom argued that sovereignty dictates once a procedure has been estab-
lished by a signatory state as a means of implementing an international
agreement, due regard be given to the procedure. Therefore, resort to
Convention procedures in the first instance is required. 162
Furthermore, the United Kingdom argued that judicial practice in the
United States embodies mutual self-restraint between signatories. As a
result, when a state advances a sovereign interest through, for example,
foreign blocking legislation, that exercise of sovereignty must be
respected by the requesting state. 163 Although the United States identi-
fied several substantial interests in obtaining information located in
France, 16 the French blocking statute does not threaten that interest,
but merely mandates that designated procedures be followed in consider-
ation of France's sovereignty.1 65
Finally, the brief promoted the underlying interest of a stable and de-
pendable international system. The application of one state's laws in
such a way that requires violations of foreign laws should be avoided
whenever possible in the interest of fairness to the parties. 166
2. Federal Republic of Germany
In its amicus brief, the government of West Germany examined dis-
covery procedures prior to the Convention and characterized them as
inadequate and chaotic.167 The negotiations leading up to the treaty in-
161. Amicus Brief of The Government of The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland 4-8, Societe Nationale, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987). The United Kingdom agreed with the lower
court's opinion in Societe Naitonale and relied upon the permissive language found in Article I of the
Convention, which states that "a Contracting State may ... request the competent authority ......
Id. at 5 n.4 (emphasis added).
162. The brief also noted that if a request for evidence failed to be executed, then the courts are
always free to compel production of the information pursuant to domestic laws. Id. at 8.
163. Id. at 14. "United States courts should not lightly reject such expressions of sovereign
authority."
164. The interest of the United States identified in the brief was the protection of Americans
from harmful effects of defective products manufactured abroad. Id. at 14-15.
165. According to the United Kingdom, to determine ifa blocking statute threatens an identified
interest, the court should look to the possible alternatives to compelling a foreign national to break a
foreign law. Id. at 15 n.20. The French law presents no threat, claimed the United Kingdom,
because the information can be obtained through use of Convention procedures. Id. at 15. More-
over, assuming an identifiable interest, the United Kingdom suggested that the benefit to be derived
from a demonstration of respect for a foreign law would outweigh the interest. Id.
166. Id. at 19.
167. Amicus Brief for the Federal Republic of Germany 3, Societe Nationale, 107 S. Ct. 2542
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dicated a desire on behalf of all countries to bridge the gap between com-
mon law and civil law discovery methods. As a result, Germany insisted
that the Convention's procedures were applicable in Societe Nationale.
168
In support of this argument, the brief pointed to Germany's willing-
ness to aid American courts in obtaining evidence located within its terri-
tories.1 69 Additionally, the conflict seen by the lower court in Societe
Nationale between the Convention's procedures and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is ephemeral, according to Germany, because the Fed-
eral Rules were not designed for application to extraterritorial discov-
ery.17 Germany enunciated the belief that difficulties concerning the
Convention and its applicability must be resolved by diplomatic means,
not by the courts, as explicitly provided in the Convention. 171
Finally, the brief declared that any attempt by the United States to
circumvent the Convention would constitute a violation of the principle
that treaties are to be interpreted in good faith.172 Germany concluded
with a warning that should the United States attempt to take evidence in
Germany without using the Convention's procedures, such an attempt
would be considered interference with the sovereignty of the German
judiciary. 173
3. France
The Government of France expressed its dissatisfaction with Ameri-
can attempts at securing documents located within France, particularly
(1987). Prior to the Convention, asserted Germany, the only method by which an American court
could obtain access to information located in Germany was under American domestic law. Id.
Germany recognized that, traditionally, discovery requests from foreign courts were granted in
American courts, whereas the reciprocal requests of American courts were of little value in civil law
courts. Id. at 4.
168. Id. at 4-5.
169. German courts expressed this willingness in Corning Glass Works v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp.,
supra notes 146, 154. Germany pointed out that in Corning the Oberlandesgericht allowed discov-
ery even though the requests did not comply with Convention standards. Amicus Brief supra note
167, at 7.
170. Amicus Brief, supra note 167, at 11 (citing Heck, US. Misinterpretation of the Hague Evi-
dence Convention, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 231, 236 (1986)).
171. Amicus Brief, supra note 167, at 12-13. Article 36 of the Convention states: "Any difficul-
ties which may arise between Contracting States in connection with the operation of this Convention
shall be settled through diplomatic channels." Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 36.
172. Amicus Brief, supra note 167, at 14. This requirement is found in the RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 138 (1965).
173. Amicus Brief, supra note 167, at 14-15.
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in the Societe Nationale litigation.'7 4 Supporting petitioners' appeal, the
brief looked to the negotiating history and language of the Convention to
reach the conclusion that the procedures adopted provide the exclusive
means of discovery unless France determines otherwise.
The French government claimed that, given the desire of all parties to
the Convention to facilitate the taking of evidence abroad by resolving
differences in discovery techniques,"' the civil law signatories would
have had little incentive to agree to the American innovations unless the
Convention limited the procedures by which Americans could seek dis-
covery abroad.176 France also stated its belief that the discovery order at
issue infringed upon French sovereignty and violated French law.
France claimed that "the Evidence Convention protects the judicial sov-
ereignty of the country in which the evidence is taken, not the interest of
the parties to the suit.",177
The brief also declared that reasonable opportunities exist for foreign
litigants to collect evidence abroad. 178 The French Code of Civil Proce-
dure provides for compulsory discovery pursuant to the Hague Evidence
Convention.'7 9 Thus, when foreign litigants comply wih the procedures
embodied in the treaty, the French government will comply with the re-
quest in good faith to the greatest extent possible under French laws and
Convention provisions.'8 0
All three briefs by signatory states enunciate a common belief about
the applicability of the Convention's procedures. The commonality is an
understanding, by civil and common law states alike, that resort must be
made to Convention provisions when alternative methods would inter-
fere with a foreign state's sovereignty. This understanding is clearly con-
174. Amicus Brief of The Republic of France In Support of Petitioners 1, Societe Nationale, 107
S. Ct. 2542 (1987). In France's statement of interest the government declared that it had an evident
interest in regulating activities within its territory, especially because the discovery requests were
directed to French corporations. Id.
175. Id. at 8-9. France, like Germany, pointed to differences between French and American
discovery methods prior to the Convention. France claimed the Convention represented an attempt
to facilitate discovery, but did not completely alter France's system of procedure. Id.
176. Id. at 11. "The Convention should not be interpretated as if it merely gave the United
States new and unilateral privileges without imposing upon it any concomitant obligation of re-
straint." Id. at 12.
177. Id. at 15. This statement was made in response to the lower court's opinion that the Con-
vention procedures do not apply when an American court exercises personal jurisdiction over a
foreigner. Id.
178. Id. at 18-21.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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sistent with the Convention's language. Moreover, it furthers both the
fundamental principle of state sovereignty and the common desire of all
states to facilitate discovery within the international community.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States judiciary fails to engage in thorough interpretive
analysis of international agreements, like the Hague Convention, when it
ignores the subsequent interpretations of signatory states. Fundamental
principles of treaty interpretation,"'1 prior judicial decisions, and current
policy statements by the United States18 2 sanction use of this principle.
Should courts ultimately engage in this more complete decision-mak-
ing analysis, they would come face to face with sharply different interpre-
tations of the Convention. These signatory states have expressed their
understanding of the Convention's applicability in their legislation, judi-
cial opinions, and amicus briefs. Without exception 18 3 the signatory
states regard Convention procedures as mandatory in the first in-
stance.8 4 The United States judiciary should not abandon the Principle
of Subsequent Conduct but should continue to acknowledge the positions
of sovereign states when interpreting international agreements. 18  Such a
practice for the Hague Convention or other agreements would result in a
more accurate interpretation of agreements and promote international
cooperation between states.
Diane M. Peters
181. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
183. The author is unaware of signatory states who interpret the use of Convention procedures
as a purely discretionary decision by the requesting state.
184. This statement is qualified when resort is made to the traditional domestic procedures for
obtaining information in the forum state.
185. The author believes that this view does not mandate total abandonment by the courts of
United States interests. See supra note 39.
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